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MERGING THE SOCIAL AND THE PUBLIC: HOW
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS COULD BE A NEW
PUBLIC FORUM
Amélie P. Heldt*
Abstract
When Facebook and other social media sites announced in
August 2018 that they would ban extremist speakers, such as
conspiracy theorist Alex Jones, for violating their rules against hate
speech, reactions were strong. People either criticized the ban by
saying that such measures were only a drop in the bucket with regard
to toxic and harmful speech online, or they despised Facebook for
penalizing only right-wing speakers, censoring political opinions and
joining some type of anti-conservative media conglomerate. This
anecdote foremost begged the question: should someone like Alex
Jones be excluded from Facebook? Moreover, may Facebook exclude
users for publishing political opinions?
As social media platforms take up more and more space in
our daily lives, enabling not only individual and mass communication
but also offering payment and other services, there is still a need for a
common understanding regarding the social and communicative space
social media platforms create in cyberspace. This common
understanding is needed on a global scale since this is the way most
social media platforms operate. While in the social science realm a
new digital sphere was proclaimed 4 and social media platforms can be
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Id.; Robert H Lande & Chris Sagers, Who Should Conservatives Blame for Alex
Jones’ Ban From Social Media? Themselves. Slate (Aug. 24, 2018),
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categorized as “personal publics,” 5 there is still no such denomination
in legal scholarship that is globally agreed upon for social media.
Public space can generally be defined as a free room between the
state and society, 6 a space for freedom. Generally, it is where
individuals are protected by their fundamental rights while operating in
the public sphere. However, terms like forum, space, and sphere may
not be used as synonyms in this discussion. Under the First
Amendment, the public forum doctrine mainly serves the purposes of
democracy and truth and could be perpetuated in communication
services that promote direct dialogue between the state and citizens.
But where and by whom is the public forum guaranteed in
cyberspace? The notion of the public space in cyberspace is central,
and it constantly evolves as platforms become broader in their
services. Hence, it needs to be examined more closely. When looking
at social media platforms, we need to take into account how they
moderate speech and subsequently, how they influence social
processes. If representative democracies are built on the grounds of
deliberation, it is essential to safeguard the room for public discourse
to actually happen. Are constitutional concepts for the analog space
transferable into the digital? Should private actors such as social media
platforms be bound by freedom of speech without being considered
state actors? Accordingly, do they create a new type of public forum?
The goal of this article is to provide answers to the questions
mentioned. First, it will give an overview of the doctrinal concept of
public forum doctrine in U.S. constitutional scholarship and its choke
points related to cyberspace. Second, it will introduce the notion of
“public” in German constitutional jurisprudence as a point of
reference and the outcome of the comparative analysis. It will answer
whether the public forum doctrine and the definition of “public” in
Germany serve the same function in both systems, and, if so, how the
doctrine needs to be taken into account by non-state actors. The focus
will be on the consequences of this comparison for the digital sphere,
7

8

9

Jan-Hinrik Schmidt, Social Media 30 (2013).
Klaus Eder, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie, in EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION 85–120
(Markus Jachtenfuchs & Beate Kohler-Koch eds., 2003).
Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2011).
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE (1. ed. 1960); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: a
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y. U. L. REV. 1,
27. (2004); JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL
INQUIRY 105 (Melvin L. Rogers ed., 2012).
Frank Pasquale, Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in Spheres of
Private Power, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 487, 512 (2016); Kate Klonick, The
New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131
HARV. L. REV 1598, 1658 (2018); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content
Moderation, 106 GEO. L. J. 1353, 1386 (2018).
5
6

7
8

9

2020]

MERGING THE SOCIAL AND THE PUBLIC

999

such as for the intermediaries that globally connect users and provide
platforms to share content. The fundamental question is to which
extent platforms can factually be the hosts of public discourse and at
the same time enforce their own rules on the basis of their contractual
relationship with users, such as moderating content. Gaining more
clarity about these questions would serve the purpose of possibly
revising our current expectations towards platforms, which are based
on their role in modern society rather than on legal obligations. It
would also show that judicial review can serve as a flexible tool if the
doctrine is open to changes in society. Finally, this article proposes an
extension of the public forum doctrine that would be based on the
findings of the first parts and could serve as potential guidance to the
courts that are applying the public forum doctrine in practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Issue: The Public Forum Doctrine in Cyberspace
Hardly any constitutional right has been in the public debate on
the future of technology as much as freedom of speech. When social
media platforms advocate for a connected world and more global
communication, does the First Amendment favor or disfavor their
users? Can the public forum doctrine still guarantee spaces where
citizens enjoy their First Amendment rights in the digital age? The
answer is: not really. While the First Amendment offers almost
absolute protection against governmental intervention in analog stateowned spaces, it fails to keep pace with the combined and increasing
privatization and digitization of society. Coping with the fact that
communication on the Internet mostly takes place on social media
platforms and that these platforms offer their users some form of
public sphere or place to exchange thoughts and viewpoints is a major
challenge for First Amendment scholarship and the public forum
doctrine.
Platforms are online services that “host and organize user content
for public circulation, without having produced or commissioned it.”
Because they do not produce content but monitor and control the
content generated by their users, platforms are also called
intermediaries. It is this combination of intermediaries that connect
users among each other and users who themselves become “produsers” of the platform’s content that makes this ecosystem special and
complex. Traditional media enables public discourse by supplying
curated content that fuels discussion among the audience. Sometimes
print media will interact with its audience by allowing letters to the
editor, but it remains a communicative one-way street. Via social
media platforms, anyone can react, comment, share, and discuss—
without the boundaries of the offline world.
This article attempts to provide an answer to the problem
described by using functional comparison. In doing so, this paper
offers a solution statement by analyzing how citizens can exercise their
free speech rights in public spaces, in the U.S., and in the German
context. The goal is to contribute to the debate on how to adapt the
public forum doctrine to the needs of today’s communication
10
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Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace Contents, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1117–18 (2005).
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MEDIA 254–1 (Jean Burgess, Thomas Poell & Alice Marweck eds., 2017).
See id. at 3.
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environment on an individual and societal level. To achieve that, we
need to get a more granular sense of what is meant by “public” and to
be more specific about our understanding of “public spaces” on social
media platforms. Indeed, the word public can have different meanings
and different normative effects according to the context. Part II
describes the public forum doctrine and its limits in protecting speech
in the digital sphere. Part III presents the notion of public in German
constitutional scholarship and the takeaways of the comparative
approach. Part IV is dedicated to the challenge of protecting speech
online, while Part V offers a solution statement.
13

14

B. What is “Public”?
To avoid confusion, a brief introduction to the variations of the
word “public” used in this article is necessary. When speaking of the
public forum doctrine in U.S. constitutional law, this article will refer
to it as “public forum.” The public forum doctrine does not include all
places considered publicly accessible; instead, it has a restrictive
conception of what is a public forum. Places that are accessible to or
shared by all members of the community will be referred to as “public
spaces.” “The Public” refers to the concept used by the German
Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter FCC) to describe places
devoted to the general welfare (“Öffentlichkeit”). It is difficult to
distinguish the different meanings of the word public in a clearer way
because the terminology used in this area is so similar, and this
similarity of the terms used is part of the problem described above.
This article will, therefore, provide an overview of the U.S. public
forum doctrine and its limits with regard to digital communication and
conduct a functional comparison with German constitutional law. The
result of the comparison will demonstrate that, in light of the heavy use
of social media platforms, a doctrinal update of the public forum
doctrine is necessary. Part of a more contemporary interpretation and
suitable conceptualization of the public forum could be a new
category, which this article calls the social public forum and which
could be integrated into the current doctrinal model between the
designated public forum and the nonpublic public forum.
The term “public forum,” used for privileged speech protection
under the First Amendment, is very similar to the German term
“public” (“Öffentlichkeit”) as a space dedicated to the exchange of
Rikke Frank Jørgensen, When Private Actors Govern Human Rights, RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 346, 363 (Ben Wagner,
Matthias C. Kettemann, & Kilian Vieth eds., 2019).
Public, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public
[https://perma.cc/WE6F-2YTE].
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information and opinions. However, their respective jurisprudence
shows that not only the interpretation of freedom of speech differs
between western democratic states 15 but also that of the forum. 16 A
comparative approach can be helpful when identifying a doctrinal culde-sac such as the challenge of applying the public forum doctrine in
cyberspace. The FCC defined the notion of “Public” as follows: “[i]t is
characterized by the fact that a multitude of different activities and
concerns can be pursued in it, creating a versatile and open network of
communication.” In its ensuing decision, the FCC made it clear that
privately-owned but publicly-accessible spaces cannot evade a human
rights protection of speech and social actions. The FCC partly based
its definition on ISKCON v. Lee. And yet, the Supreme Court ruled
that a publicly accessible yet privately-owned terminal is not such a
public forum.
The Supreme Court has recognized the societal importance of
the Internet in Reno v. ACLU and of social media platforms in
Packingham v. North Carolina, but only insofar as the State was not
allowed to restrict access to such services. Calling social networks
“essential venues for public gatherings” does not provide sufficient
guidance on how to handle the power private actors have over these
“venues.” Recent cases such as Prager University v. Google, Knight
Institute v. Trump, and Davison v. Randall have shown that we need
a more granular understanding of social media platforms in relation to
the communicative space they create. It is so far unclear to what extent
newsfeeds, profiles, and groups can be treated the same way under the
doctrine, although their functionalities and settings differ.
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II. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITS

Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999).
ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 199 (1995).
BVerfGE, 128, 226, 253.
BVerfG, July 18, 2015 - 1 BvQ 25/15.
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017).
Id. at 1735.
Prager Univ. v. Google LLC., No. 19-CV-340667, 2019 Cal. Super. LEXIS 2034
(Super. Ct. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019).
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir.
2019).
Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666 (4th Cir. 2019).
Moran Yemini, Missing in “State Action”: Toward a Pluralist Conception of the First
Amendment, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1149 (2019).
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A. The Public Forum Doctrine
This brief overview of the public forum doctrine within First
Amendment theory provides a basis for the discussion around the
problem of speech on social media platforms. It can by no means
reflect the many layers and nuances of a doctrine that was developed
through extensive jurisprudence and scholarship. However, a basic
understanding of its main features and its limits is a prerequisite for
this article’s argument. Through its negative formulation, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,” the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the Bill of Rights has a
broad scope of protection for the rights enshrined, namely the
freedoms of speech and assembly. Regulatory interventions by the
state are supposed to be kept as minimal as possible in order to
preserve the marketplace of ideas, a place of deliberation and public
discourse in which the most valid ideas will prevail. This protection
from governmental intervention also touches on the physical location
of the speaker—the public forum doctrine was developed to define
where citizens could exercise their right to use public spaces for
communication. If the expressive activity occurs on a governmentowned property, the level of First Amendment protection depends on
the type of space. Not all public spaces are per se public forums with
the highest protection of free speech. Instead, according to the
doctrine of the Supreme Court, only traditional and designated public
forums will be protected from regulation by means of scrutiny.
27

28

29

1. Traditional and Designated Public Forum
The public forum doctrine was developed by the Court to
guarantee First Amendment rights in spaces that “have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.” These spaces
ought to be protected from regulatory intervention in communicative
activities in the strongest way. In Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry
Educators’ Ass’n, the Court developed three types of public forums,
limiting the use of the public property for expressive purpose when
30

31

U.S. CONST. amend. I (hereinafter First Amendment).
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
ALLAN IDES, CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & SIMONA GROSSI, CONSTITUTIONAL
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 424 (Seventh ed. 2016).
Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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not a traditional or designated public forum. A traditional public
forum is a public facility that has, by long tradition, been dedicated to
“the free exchange of ideas.” This category includes public parks,
sidewalks, and areas that have been traditionally open to political
speech and debate. The state is only allowed to enforce a contentbased exclusion if its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. It may also
enforce content-neutral regulation with regard to time, space, and
manner of the place’s use, such as opening hours or other reasonable
restrictions on the use of public property.
The same applies to the second doctrinal category: the so-called
designated public forum. It “consists of public property which the state
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”
Designated public forums enjoy the same level of protection as
traditional ones, but they will only be a public forum according to the
doctrine if the state chooses to open the property for expressive
activity for part or all of the public. Furthermore, the state is not
obliged to keep the designated forum open as such. Examples of a
designated public forum are a seminar room in a public university or a
municipal theatre.
The third category—limited public forum—can be described as a
subcategory of designated public forums, since it is designated for
expressive activities by “certain groups” or for “discussion of certain
subjects.” Here, the government may reserve the forum for certain
groups or the discussion of certain topics, but the restriction must not
discriminate against speech based on viewpoint and must be
reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose. It is not strictly contentneutral but should not restrict speakers on the basis of their opinion.
32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2005).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800–02 (1985).
See id.
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980).
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132 (1981).
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 805 (Daniel A. Farber et al. eds.,
5th ed. 2013).
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Government Sponsored Social Media and Public Forum
Doctrine Under the First Amendment: Perils and Pitfalls, 19 UF PUB. L. 2, 4.
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
Id.
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 99 (2001).
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2. Spaces on the Edge or Outside
Spaces that are neither a traditional nor a designated public
forum, but government-owned, can be a nonpublic forum. According
to the Court, in a nonpublic forum the government may restrict the
content of speech, as long as the restriction is reasonable and the
restriction does not discriminate based on speakers’ viewpoints. A
nonpublic forum is “one that has not traditionally been open to the
public, where opening it to expressive conduct would ‘somehow
interfere with the objective use and purpose to which the property has
been dedicated.’” Hence, any regulation that goes beyond time,
space, or manner will be subject to a lower scrutiny than in the other
types of forum mentioned above. In Good News Club v. Milford, the
Court held that “it may be justified in reserving its forum for certain
groups or the discussion of certain topics. The power to restrict
speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not
discriminate against speech based on viewpoint and must be
reasonable in light of the forum’s purpose.”
Finally, some public property is not a public forum at all and thus
is not subject to this forum analysis. For example, public television
broadcasters are not subject to the forum analysis when they decide
what shows to air. In sum, for a space to be “a public meeting place for
open discussion,” it needs to meet various requirements. Additionally,
it must be a government-owned property space traditionally dedicated
to the free exchange of ideas or dedicated to this purpose by the
government. Ultimately, it is a governmental decision as to whether a
place shall be such a public forum and accordingly to decide whether
the government will be allowed to regulate speech or not. Apart from
the ancient agora or forum, hardly any space in the public sphere only
serves the purpose of dialogue. Government property generally serves
other public purposes like education, trade, and security, which can
always be preferred when it comes to the purpose the special entity is
primarily dedicated to. This was proven true by decisions of the Court
on facilities like jails or military bases.
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Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 49; see generally Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S.
Ct. 1876 (2018).
Warren v. Fairfax Cty., 196 F.3d 186, 190–91 (4th Cir. 1999).
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 99 (2001).
Forum, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/forum
[https://perma.cc/B752-6Y3C].
See Lidsky, supra note 7, at 2012.
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
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Because of this, the public forum doctrine has a restrictive effect
on free speech. This is partly due to the inconsistent approach the
Court has taken and it is leading to one result—narrowing down the
scope of what is considered a public forum. Although the primary
function of the public forum doctrine is to guarantee spaces where one
may enjoy their freedom of speech, it is factually restricting speakers in
their choice of place. As demonstrated so far, traditional and
designated forums are by no means the dominant category of public
forums nowadays (in terms of share), especially when we think of the
increasing privatization of property (which will be examined below). If
the status of a traditional or designated public forum is accorded only a
limited number of spaces, the doctrine has—to a certain extent—and
will increasingly have a restrictive effect on freedom of speech.
49

B. Not So Public?
Private property is not considered a public forum and private
parties are not subject to the First Amendment’s protections for free
speech, leaving it to the owner’s discretion to what extent a property
can be used for expressive purposes. The relationship (contractual or
not ) between the owner and the user of the property is exempt from
First Amendment scrutiny unless the private owner is considered a
state actor—a status which can be attributed to the owner by a court
according to the state action doctrine. The state action doctrine has a
long tradition in Court jurisprudence and constitutional scholarship. In
this article, the state action doctrine can and shall only be summarized
briefly accordingly to the scope of the problem—its intertwinement
with the public forum doctrine. Indeed, the overlap of both is crucial
for the understanding of the argument above. The public forum
doctrine can have an even more restrictive effect on free speech if its
application on private parties is minor although the public sphere
becomes increasingly private. Scholars have been warning about this
trend since the 1990s, and although the fear expressed back then did
not fully become reality, the discussion is ongoing on a global scale.
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Hereinafter, the word speech is used to refer to protected and non-commercial
speech. It might, in certain cases, be non-verbal when speakers use pictures or videos to
express their opinions, but this paper will essentially look at non-symbolic speech.
Whether governed by an agreement in a formal sense or any other form of consensus.
MICHAEL SORKIN, VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND
THE END OF PUBLIC SPACE (1992).
Judit Bodnar, Reclaiming Public Space, 52 URBAN STUD. 2090 (2015).
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1. Can There Be a Public Forum Owned by a Private Party?
Under the state action doctrine, private parties are exempt from
applying third-party fundamental rights enshrined in the Bill of
Rights. The rationale behind the state action doctrine is to preserve
private autonomy, leaving the relationship between private parties
immune to the application of the Constitution. Private parties may
only be subject to the same obligations as the government if they fall
under the public function or the entanglement exception. In its
landmark case of Marsh v. Alabama, the Court declared that a
company-town was a state actor under the public function exception,
which resulted in the protection of speech on the company-town’s
streets as in any other city, with the following reasoning: “[m]any
people in the United States live in company-owned towns . . . . [t]here
is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for
curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other citizen.” In
Jackson v. Edison Co., the Court restricted the public function
exception to activities that had been traditionally carried out
exclusively by the state. Later, it defined the “entanglement
constellation” as a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the
challenged action of the (private) entity so that the action of the latter
may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.
In these two cases, the private actor can be treated as a state actor
and, in the context of the First Amendment, can be subject to the
scrutiny of traditional or designated public forums. The courts need to
perform a detailed inquiry to determine if a private actor meets the
test. However, the Court’s broad interpretation of a state actor in
Marsh v. Alabama was unique in its kind, and one should refrain from
applying the company-town analogy to other private properties used
for expressive activities. In no other case has the Court expanded
governmental principles to that extent to a private actor—a
development for which it has been largely criticized, not least because
its jurisprudence in that question is considered inconsistent.
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Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 524 (4th
ed. 2011).
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1536 (8th ed. 2018);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 529.
STONE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1536; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 529.
STONE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1574.
Charles L. Black Jr., Foreword:" State Action," Equal Protection and California’s
Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV 69, 95 (1967); Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State
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Indeed, the Court has been reluctant to widen the scope of
application to private spaces both in the analog and the digital world.
This goes in the opposite direction of an increasing privatization over
the past decades: from the company-town (Marsh v. Alabama), to
restricted public spaces within private property in big cities (e.g., New
York City zoning resolutions ) to private shopping malls (Lloyd v.
Tanner), public life is no longer happening in solely traditional public
spaces like streets, sidewalks, and parks. The consequences of this
development on freedom of speech are substantial, and this article
shall look at them more closely after clarifying how to classify a space
that is not considered a traditional or designated public forum.
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2. Spaces Designed for Shopping, Not Speaking
The First Amendment does not apply to privately-owned spaces
unless the space meets either the public function or entanglement test
under the state action doctrine. If the privately-owned space meets
either of those tests, it must fulfill the same obligations as a state-owned
space. Private owners may dispose of their property as they wish
(while still respecting the law) and exclude any third-party from
trespassing or using the property for expressive use. If a right to enter
the property is granted to the general public (because of commercial
activity, for example), this permission does not implicitly grant a right
to use it beyond the intent of the private owner as a public forum.
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Shopping malls are a good example of a space open to the
general public but privately-owned and not subject to First
Amendment rights. In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Court ruled that
shopping malls were not public forums and that protesters did not
enjoy the right to express themselves under the First Amendment
therein. They may “very well function as de facto urban centers, they
do not take over the function of the city square.” The owner may
restrict the use for expressive purposes in the same way she can
exercise any other property rights. Opening a private property to the
general public does not come with the obligation to guarantee freedom
of speech (except in cases of state action), marking a clear separation
between private and public space in relation to the freedom of
speech.
However, this strict separation of public and private spaces can
have negative effects according to the First Amendment rationale—to
enable as much speech as possible. Enabling as much speech as
possible might not be necessarily commendable for the purposes of
freedom of speech, but it has been the steady interpretation of the
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Not only should contentbased governmental intervention be restricted to the minimum, but
the chilling effect of other non-governmental measures should be a
concern as well.
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C. From Shopping Malls to Cyberspace
The question of how to balance the protection of private
property and free speech has become even more urgent since
digitization. In Denver Area v. Federal Communications Commission,
Justice Kennedy stressed the importance of adapting the existing
doctrine to the challenges of new facts: “[w]hen confronted with a
threat to free speech in the context of an emerging technology, we
ought to have the discipline to analyze the case by reference to existing
elaborations of constant First Amendment principles.” If television
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stations are deemed non-state actors, they can limit free speech. This
was recently confirmed in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v.
Halleck. The Court held that private entities running public access
channels were not state actors, and therefore not subject to the
constraints imposed on state action by the First Amendment. This
decision was expected to deliver guidance on how to deal with social
media platforms. Although the Court strictly stuck to the television
channel’s case, one could interpret the ruling as a step away from
possibly subsuming social media platforms under the state action
doctrine. This would subsequently mean that they could not be
considered public forums under the current doctrine.
While the Internet enables communication at a larger scale, it
has, at the same time, fostered new, private gatekeepers with unseen
powers over public communication. Social media platforms and other
intermediaries are on the one hand aiming at providing a service of
communication and information (“bringing the world closer
together” ), but they also impose the strict rules under which this
communication process is allowed. They represent the main speech
infrastructure online and may restrict the platform’s use in accordance
with the rights of a private owner to do so. What cannot be forbidden
in a public forum because of the broad protection under the Free
Speech Clause can be banned because of the private nature of the
relationship between users and platforms. This matter has been
raised by scholars before, although it has, until recently, rather been
perceived as a positive effect for free speech, namely the ultimate
remedy from government interference. The dilemma of the First
Amendment can be summarized as follows: in cyberspace,
communication platforms are not public forums since cyberspace is in
76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

76

Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).

77

Id.
Id. at 1934.

78

Colin Lecher, First Amendment Constraints Don’t Apply to Private Pplatforms,
Court
Affirms,
THE
VERGE
(June
17,
2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/6/17/18682099/supreme-court-ruling-firstamendment-social-media-public-forum [https://perma.cc/T29C-3BAY].
Philip M. Napoli, Social Media and the Public Interest: Governance of News
Platforms in the Realm of Individual and Algorithmic Gatekeepers, 39 TELECOMM.
POL’Y 751, 757 (2015).
See Facebook’s mission statement, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about
[https://perma.cc/T8VU-XXA5].
Luca Belli & Jamila Venturini, Private Ordering and the Rise of Terms of Service as
Cyber-Regulation,
IPR
(Dec.
29,
2016),
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/private-ordering-and-rise-terms-service-cyberregulation [https://perma.cc/CG63-7A4M].
79

Supreme

80

81

82

83

Id.

84

Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 88 (2003).

1012

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:5

its structure mostly privately owned, leaving it to each platform’s
discretion to what extent it will provide a space for free speech.
This does not mean that the Court does not recognize the
importance of the Internet in today’s communication structure. In fact,
in Reno v. ACLU and Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court
asserted the great importance of online services and having access to
them. In the first case, the Court stated that First Amendment rights
were applicable in the context of communications undertaken via the
Internet and called cyberspace the “vast democratic forums of the
Internet.” Packingham v. North Carolina confirmed the importance
of cyberspace for the First Amendment and for social media in
particular. However, the Court has been reluctant to apply the state
action doctrine to private parties in general, which makes it unlikely
that the providers of online communication infrastructure will be
considered state actors. The prevailing opinion is that—according to
the principles and the wording of the First Amendment—only the
government needs to be watched when it comes to the speech-related
interventions, not social media platforms. As non-state actors, the
latter are free to define the terms of use of their service (including
communicating by means of sharing, tweeting, and messaging), just like
any private party offering services to the general public.
A competing school of thought pushes a more affirmative and
speech-protective role of the government, declaring that the
government ought to set the conditions of the digital marketplace of
ideas in order for it to serve democratic values. This would underline
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the democracy-based theories of free speech, making cyberspace
eventually indispensable for our democratic culture and system. This
position does not, by any means, represent the prevailing opinion
among First Amendment scholars, partly because this school relies
more on free speech values than on First Amendment rights.
Generally speaking, values and rights do not conflict with each other,
as the values conveyed by the First Amendment are obviously
overlapping with the rights enshrined. They are, however, technically
not the same because the interpretation of the First Amendment is
broader than its wording. The jurisprudence and the scholarship
around free speech have contributed to the development of our First
Amendment understanding—such as the public forum doctrine—and
are as much part of this fundamental right as the wording.
It is also important to note that there is no absolute consensus on
the issue of a more affirmative interpretation of the First Amendment
protection. As stated by Dawn Nunziato: “[t]o remedy this problem,
we need to introduce spaces in which individuals’ free speech is
constitutionally protected instead of leaving the protection of free
speech at the mercy of private speech regulators.” One way could be
to reevaluate the “traditionality” component of the traditional public
forum doctrine as Nunziato suggests. Nunziato argues for a
reinterpretation by the courts; courts could intervene on the state level
and interpret their respective constitutions’ free speech clause. This
would detach the subsuming of a public forum as traditional from the
restrictive jurisprudence. Courts could also try to reinterpret standards
of the traditional public forum such as the “principal and historical
purpose” and the “unfettered access,” but as long as the standards stay
as such, there will be no contemporary (and yet) traditional public
forum.
The preceding section shows that the public forum doctrine is
supposed to guarantee each citizen a space to express thoughts, ideas,
and criticism, which cannot be restricted by the government beyond
neutral time, space, and manner rules. Due to the broad scope of
protection of the Free Speech Clause, this shall only apply to public
property under certain conditions and not to private property where
owners have the right to govern the use of their property for expressive
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conduct. This, in turn, has substantial effects on communication in
the digital sphere, which underlines this article’s argument that the
public forum doctrine has a restrictive effect as far as traditional public
forums diminish de facto. What is the way to go, if the categories
above will not allow adequate protection of speech in the context of
social media platforms and if the components and standards of
traditional doctrine do not leave room for a contemporary
application? Cass Sunstein called for a “reevaluation in the light of
free speech principles” which shall be the guiding principle for the
comparative analysis below.
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III. THE PUBLIC FORUM IN GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Germany and the U.S. are often used as cases in comparative
constitutional law since their respective principles of protecting
freedom of speech are quite divergent. The First Amendment offers
broad protection from the coercive power of the state as described
above, while the German concept of freedom of speech is more
affirmative and a less general proviso. The main difference between
the two is that the limits of free speech in Germany are stipulated in
Article 5 (2) Basic Law. According to this law, the government is
allowed to restrict speech in a content-based manner under specific
circumstances. The First Amendment, on the other hand, precisely
forbids this type of law because it would potentially restrict an
individual’s freedom of expression. Thus, concepts cannot be
transferred from one legal system to another without certain
adaptations. They can nevertheless contribute mutually helpful
elements when dealing with the same issue, such as defining
proportionate rules for new types of communication. The scholarship
in this area is large and touches on the interpretations of both
constitutional courts on the limits of free speech. Free speech, of
course, has to do with the foundations of each constitution and the
respective cultures of both countries. The Free Speech Clauses of the
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First Amendment and of Article 5(1) Basic Law can therefore not be
compared without further analysis.
Under Article 5(1) Basic Law “[e]very person shall have the right
freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing, and
pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally
accessible sources. . . . There shall be no censorship.” This includes
the right to choose where and how to express his opinions. The limits
to these rights are set in Article 5(2) Basic Law: “[t]hese rights shall
find their limits in the provisions of general laws, in provisions for the
protection of young persons, and in the right to personal honor.”
Such general laws include property law, which is relevant to the
question of the public forum analyzed here. There is no direct
equivalent in German constitutional law to the U.S. public forum
doctrine, which confirms the functional method to look for an
equivalent concept fulfilling a similar task. Based on the functional
principle, namely: “[t]he incomparable cannot be meaningfully
compared, and comparable in law is only what fulfills the same task,
the same function.” The objective here is to find an equivalent to the
U.S. public forum in the jurisprudence of the FCC and, by pointing
out similarities and differences between both, to find an approach to
the problem of the public doctrine in cyberspace.
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A. The “Public”
There is no direct equivalent of the public forum doctrine in
German constitutional law. Instead, a space in which the speaker can
Regulating Hate Speech - Damned if You Do and Damned if You Don’t: Lessons
Learned from Comparing the German and US Approaches, 23 BU INT’L LJ 299, 300
(2005).
Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] Jul. 11, 2012,
art. 5, § 1 (Ger.). Official translation by: Professor Christian Tomuschat and Professor
David P. Currie.
Franz Schemmer, GG Art. 5 [Recht der freien Meinungsäußerung], BECKOK
GRUNDGESETZ 9 (Volker Epping & Christian Hillgruber eds., 37 ed. 2018).
GG Jul. 11, 2012, art. 5 § 2.
Tushnet, supra note 15, at 1238; Francesca Bignami, Formal Versus Functional
Method in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 442, 464 (2016);
Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339, 368, 381 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006); UWE KISCHEL, RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 93 (2015); Mark
Van Hoecke, Methodology of Comparative Research, LAW AND METHOD 9 (2015).
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG:
AUF DEM GEBIETE DES PRIVATRECHTS 33 (3., neubearb. Aufl. ed. 1996).
The Federal Constitutional Court, in German: Bundesverfassungsgericht, is the
highest court in Germany, but strictly limited to constitutional matters and not an
appellate court in other matters.
106

107

108
109

110

111

1016

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:5

choose to speak free from governmental intervention is “the Public,”
which in general refers to an area of people seen as a whole, in which
something has become generally known and accessible to all. Legally
speaking, “public” means a place where individuals need to respect the
law but are, at the same time, protected by fundamental rights from
unjustified law enforcement or any restrictive action by the state that is
not covered by constitutional proviso.
The Public, as defined by the FCC, fulfills the function of a
public forum but is not limited to the rights enshrined in Article 5(1)
Basic Law, such as freedom of speech or the freedom to assemble.
The Public (as a translation of the concept of “Öffentlichkeit”) is
closely related to the concept of the public sphere in social science,
which is the space in which the formation of public opinion takes
place. According to Habermas, the public sphere is “a network for
communicating information and points of view.” Although Habermas
himself warned against equating the Public and the public sphere, the
notion of Public cannot be perceived without the element of people
gathering to exchange ideas and thoughts, and therefore participating
in the public discourse. The Public can also be summarized as a free
room between the state and society, a space for freedom. This article
will take a closer look at the Public as a space for communication
below.
Even though the public is a space in which citizens will mostly
enjoy their “societal” freedom (the freedoms of speech, assembly, and
voting) it is not strictly limited to the latter in German constitutional
law. Instead, the public allows all rights the citizen owns to be
protected from the power of the state. The freedoms of movement, of
informational self-determination, of religious belief, of the protection
of the family, of property, and of profession are granted as well.
Hence, the Public can, as well, be defined by delimiting it from private
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spaces which will, on the contrary, be governed by the owner’s rights.
Its relationship with third parties will be based on some type of
consensus: contractual or quasi-contractual nature (culpa in
contrahendo, if preliminary to a contract).

B. The “Public” as a Space for Deliberation
Without using the Public as a synonym for the public sphere, the
notion is still closely connected to the use of public spaces in order to
participate in societal activities, such as the formation of public
opinion. To serve this purpose the Public is protected—amongst
other laws—by Article 5(1) Basic Law. The close relationship between
the scope of protection of free speech and the concept of Public is
best explained by a concrete example. The Fraport decision
demonstrates the close link between the legal and the social concepts
of the public in the FCC’s jurisprudence. The FCC’s holdings are
particularly clear in this decision, showing that the FCC leans on the
societal function of public spaces to define them as public. In the
Fraport decision, the FCC sets its standards for public communication,
a truly remarkable decision, striking in its clarity regarding the risks
inherent to privatization and its outlook with regard to digitization.
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1. The FCC’s Fraport Ruling
The defendant in Fraport was a company operating the airport
of Frankfurt, the Fraport AG. It had prohibited a demonstration in
the airport’s terminal. The latter was publicly accessible, as it was
open to the general public without any security check and hosted
various stores and services, similar to a shopping mall. The
complainant was the organizer of a demonstration against deportation
at the Frankfurt airport, and her complaint was directed at the
judgments of the civil courts affirming a ban, which prevented her
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from using the airport for expressing her opinion and for
demonstrations without the Fraport AG’s permission. The FCC
ruled in favor of the complainant, arguing that a space such as an
airport terminal represented a public forum and was therefore subject
to the freedoms of speech and assembly set out in Article 5(1) and 8(1)
Basic Law.
In its decision, the FCC referred to the U.S. Supreme Court,
holding that “[t]he question of whether such a place that is located
outside public streets and places can be deemed a public space for
communication can be answered according to the concept of the
public forum.” The FCC cited two decisions by the Supreme Court
of Canada and the U.S. Supreme Court as “examples” for “similar
criteria.” It did not endorse the U.S. public forum doctrine, but
rather mentioned it as one possibility to define the Public as a forum
in the broader sense. The FCC used the foreign rulings to underline
its traditional case law on the protection of the Public and its use for
public opinion. This detour seems almost unnecessary, especially in
light of its constant jurisprudence on the horizontal effect of
fundamental rights. However, it showed that the FCC is attentive to
foreign jurisprudence, especially when it comes to fundamental
questions for German society.
The FCC justified its positive answer to the question “of whether
such a place . . . can be deemed a public space for communication . .
.” by emphasizing the role that private companies assume when
taking over “the provision of public communications and thus assume
functions which were previously allocated to the state as part of its
services of general interest.” By way of analogy to the “public street
space,” the FCC concluded that a public space for communication is a
place “open to public traffic and where places of general
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communication develop.” The public street space is “the natural
forum that citizens have used historically to express their concerns
especially effectively in public and to thus prompt communication.”
It expanded this concept to places outside public streets, stating that “a
public forum is characterized by the fact that it can be used to pursue a
variety of different activities and concerns leading to the development
of a varied and open communications network.” According to the
FCC, once space is made available for communicative uses, “political
debate in the form of collective expressions of opinion through
assemblies” may not be excluded from it. It concluded this type of
space was “the basis for the democratic formation of will and a
constitutive element of the democratic governmental order.”
The FCC emphasized the structural function of the Public for
representative democracies and therefore based its definition on
whether or not it was open to public traffic and to communicative
activities. It was not decisive whether the government had
traditionally opened airport terminals for expressive purposes or
designated them as such. On the contrary, it stressed that if a
property owner opened her space to the general public, she could not
limit the communicative activities of the people entering this space.
The defendant argued that the airport terminal was different from the
traditional public street space because the shops and services only
served the main purpose of the space, which was to be an airport.
The FCC clearly pushed back on this argument, which could
potentially be a loophole for similar cases. By doing so, it shifted the
definition of “the Public” from state-owned to a space defined by de
facto communicative use.
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The Fraport decision is special because the FCC expressed the
need to protect the freedoms of speech and assembly beyond the
boundaries of classical public spaces, expanding the protection of
Articles 5 and 8 Basic Law to spaces considered “public” due to the
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way citizens would use them for communicative purposes. This
decision is also relevant in light of the horizontal effect on fundamental
rights. This principle was established in an early landmark decision of
the FCC, in which it stated that fundamental rights may come into
effect between private parties if the court of lower instance did not
sufficiently observe the fundamental rights of a party when deciding its
verdict. Although fundamental rights primarily serve the purpose of
defending citizens against the state, they may under certain
circumstances come to affect private parties via the verdict of a court.
The horizontal effect is highly relevant to the question of public
forums: if private property is accessible to the general public and
meets the requirements above, it can potentially be subject to similar
obligations as the state. In addition to the Fraport ruling, the FCC
explicitly addressed the issue of privately-owned spaces in two recent
decisions and confirmed the above.
In the first case (“Bierdosenflashmob”), the FCC decided that a
privately owned but publicly accessible square in the city center could
be part of the Public as defined above and could therefore be a space
for communication and assembly, regardless of the fact that it was
privately owned. As a result, the owner had to allow a demonstration
even if there was no substantive link between the square and the cause
of the demonstration. The complainant did not need to prove she
could only achieve her expressive purpose when demonstrating on
that specific square. The decision mostly confirmed what the FCC had
decided in Fraport, while extending it to properties that are exclusively
private.
In the second relevant case (“Stadionverbot”), the complainant
had been excluded permanently from a football stadium because he
146

147

148

149

150

151

146

Id.

In German scholarship it is referred to as the “indirect application of fundamental
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fundamental rights.” For the sake of clarity, the latter will be used throughout the rest of
the paper.
Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7
BvR
198
(Ger.),
https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=51
[https://perma.cc/NV4D-TNLD].
147

148

149

Id.

Bundersverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 18, 2015, 1
BvQ 25 (Ger.).
In Fraport, the FCC explained that it was not relevant for its decision that the state
owned the majority of shares of the corporation, but it was hypothetical because Fraport
was in fact a public company.

150

151

2020]

MERGING THE SOCIAL AND THE PUBLIC 1021

was suspected to have been a hooligan in the past. The FCC declared
that the defendant, a limited liability corporation running the stadium,
was obliged to respect the complainant’s fundamental right to
nondiscrimination under Article 3(1) Basic Law. It held that there
needs to be a substantial reason to exclude someone from an activity
relevant to life in society, such as major football games. Such an
exclusion would require granting a right to appeal a (private) decision
when excluding an individual from the public (sphere). By doing so,
the FCC surpassed its broad interpretation of the Public in Fraport
and Bierdosenflashmob and expanded its protection to the
opportunity of each individual taking part in societal life.
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3.Defining the Public in Cyberspace
The jurisprudence of the FCC shows that it considers the Public
a space for activities relevant to society, without the requirement of
core political speech (assuming that watching football games is not a
political activity). The FCC bases its decision on the way citizens use
the space to take part in public life and public discourse. There is
currently no decision by the FCC regarding the application of these
principles in cyberspace. However, it has indicated in Fraport and in
another decision concerning public broadcasting and the formation of
public opinion (Rundfunkbeitrag II) that there was no apparent
reason to exempt social media platforms from this principle. In
general, German scholarship relies on the principle of applying the
same rules “offline and online.” To what extent the FCC will apply
the horizontal effect of freedom of speech and subsequently restrict a
platform’s right to moderate user-generated content remains to be
seen.
There is a high probability that the FCC will fall back on
scholarship in social science, just as it previously did with Habermas
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and others. The court has never been reluctant to ground its decisions
on the findings of other disciplines when applicable. While legal
scholars are still struggling with the issue of content moderation due to
the lack of clarity about how to transfer constitutional concepts in
cyberspace, the scholarship in other fields is more advanced. In
sociology, cyberspace is considered a “new public space for political
discussion,” or even a “new public sphere”:
To harness the power of the world’s public
opinion through global media and Internet networks is
the most effective form of broadening political
participation on a global scale, by inducing a fruitful,
synergistic connection between the government-based
international institutions and the global civil society.
This multimodal communication space is what
constitutes the new global public sphere.
160
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This perception of the Internet as a whole is very broad but
insightful. Social media platforms have been categorized as “personal
publics,” since they are accessible to the general public but
categorized in an individual manner for each user. This kind of
conceptual transfer from the analog to the digital seems quite natural
when looking at the proportion of communication taking place in
cyberspace and, in particular, on social media platforms. The
takeaways for legal scholars are that our doctrinal categories need to be
more permeable to societal changes.
162

C. Interim Conclusion of the Comparative Approach
From the definition of the Public in German constitutional law
and its close link to other social sciences, we can draw several
conclusions regarding the comparison with the U.S. public forum
doctrine. The two concepts overlap in some aspects, but there is an
important difference in substance. Formally, fundamental rights are
applicable to public spaces as state-owned spaces in both jurisdictions.
Both concepts serve the same purpose and can be considered
equivalent. As much as the First Amendment rights are protected in
traditional and designated public forums, the Public in Germany is a
space where citizens enjoy the protection of their fundamental rights
(“Grundrechte”) but where the law is applicable nonetheless and might
restrict their rights by the constitutional proviso. The designation of a
place as part of the Public does not grant more freedom than under
the public forum doctrine because the lawmakers in Germany are
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allowed to restrict freedom of speech. The limits of freedom of speech
under Article 5(2) Basic Law might even be more restrictive than the
categories of non-protected speech under the First Amendment
because they may be content related. However, it does not appear that
the Public has a restrictive effect similar to the public forum doctrine.
The reason for this conclusion lies in the difference between the two.
The difference is substantive in nature. In Germany, the Public is
a space defined by its societal function. For this, the social use of space
and social norms shall be taken into account at a great scale to
preserve the societal function for public discourse. As demonstrated,
the FCC clearly prioritizes the societal function of public spaces,
especially as a place where public discourse happens, regardless of it
being private or state-owned property. In doing so, the concept of the
Public is open to new developments in society. It adapts to where its
members actually choose to express their opinions and exchange
ideas. Within this open concept, the limits of free speech in the Public
are defined by law, whereas under the public forum doctrine there
cannot be such content-based restrictions. Nonetheless, the Public is
more prompt to fulfill the need of citizens for an ideal agora—a public
forum in a non-legal sense because it responds to a reality in society
and does not need a governmental intervention as the public forum
doctrine does with its requirements of traditionality and designation.
While it might seem experimental and audacious to use a
constitutional comparison, this idea is not completely alien to the First
Amendment doctrine. As the Court articulated in Red Lion v. Federal
Communications Commission with regards to the fairness doctrine:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee. It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which
is crucial here.
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In order to guarantee access to the marketplace of ideas, one
needs to consider adopting a definition of spaces that somehow
integrates the infrastructure of our deliberative spaces. While public
space in the analog world is by default the sphere we naturally operate
in, this no longer applies to the Internet and the dominating social
media platforms.
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IV. WHAT IS SO DIFFERENT ABOUT SPEECH ON SOCIAL MEDIA
PLATFORMS?
Having clarified the main difference between the public forum
doctrine and its functional equivalent in German scholarship–the
Public–it is necessary to elaborate on the issues encountered with usergenerated content on social media platforms. What is so different
about speech on intermediaries that makes it difficult to subsume
under the current First Amendment theory?

A. Content Moderation is Necessary
Some opinions under the First Amendment are protected
although they might be considered undesirable for the majority, like
toxic or hate speech. In the marketplace of ideas, they will compete
with other opinions, and, so the rationale goes, the truth will emerge.
According to Mill, the argument is important not because it refers to
the survival theory of truth. Instead, it is the exchange of knowledge
that leads to the truth:
Allowing contrary opinions to be expressed is the
only way to give ourselves the opportunity to reject the
received opinion when the received opinion is false. A
policy of suppressing false beliefs will, in fact, suppress
some true ones, and therefore a policy of suppression
impedes the search of truth.
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While the argument of knowledge enhancement through
dialogue remains valid, it is possible to question its viability in the
current social media environment based on user-generated content
and the engagement it generates. User-generated speech is generally
written and published by users via a post, a tweet, or a comment. It can
also be recorded and uploaded in a video or audio file. What matters
here is that it stays—it is not volatile. Speech that is protected by the
First Amendment within the rationale of the marketplace of ideas
could potentially cause more harm online than if pronounced on the
streets or in a park. Social media platforms are flooded with speech
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of different types, and speakers do not always have the intent of
participating in the quest for truth. Extremists have access to an
audience they did not reach in times before the social web.
Therefore, when the Internet is used “as a vehicle for hate,” the
effects on the public discourse are different and they last because
people can engage with the content in many ways. These issues are not
limited to certain platforms. It is still unclear what the consequences of
online hate speech could be offline, but when specific groups and
minorities are targeted on social media it could lead to hatred and
violence in the “real world.”
When looking at the reasons why social media platforms need
content moderation and perhaps also need support from algorithms or
machine learning, numbers tell more than words: four hundred hours
of content are uploaded on YouTube per minute. On one hand, it
shows how many people use social media to express themselves and
how platforms offer people a medium to articulate what was not heard
in traditional media outlets. On the other hand, platforms are a
display for disturbing, unwanted, and sometimes illegal content that
users do not want to be confronted with and expect the platforms to
remove. YouTube, for instance, removed 2,398,961 channels from
October 2018 to December 2018, and the three main reasons for
removal were (in order of importance): (1) spam, misleading or
collusive content; (2) nudity or sexually explicit content; and (3) child
protection. At the same time, people would rather engage with
content that they react to emotionally, such as moral outrage. The
complexity of the connections between platforms and users adds to
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the underlying moral and legal questions. Content moderation is a
challenging task, but one that cannot be ignored. As Langvardt rightly
put it: “[i]magine your email without spam filtering, or your Facebook
feed if it were populated daily with beheading videos and violent
pornography.” Daily news and recent events, such as the live stream
of the shooting in New Zealand as the most recent and horrible
example, show that, although users want to be informed (“the
information society”), they do not wish to be exposed to raw content,
which in turn has economic consequences for the platforms.
If it is agreed that content moderation is a necessity, subsequent
questions are related to its implementation and enforcement: who
should moderate what type of content, according to which rules, and
with the help of which tools? These questions and the answers to them
are not trivial. Although a majority of users are not confronted with
the problem of moderation–because they do not break the rules–
community guidelines and their enforcement are the backbone of the
social web. Nonetheless, the platforms’ modus operandi is still very
opaque.
This opacity is also linked to the implementation of content
moderation. Some platforms rely on their users and use peer-based
moderation systems. Others use a commercial content moderation
system where moderators are paid to review user-generated content.
As the teams of content moderators grew, the task was outsourced to
places where labor is cheaper; commercial content moderators are
now working from different parts of the world. Problematic content
(not “manifestly” unlawful or unwanted) will be outsourced to teams
according to the degree of complexity and/or novelty. They will
review the content, partly flagged by users, on the basis of community
rules and regulatory frameworks, if applicable.
If the decision to take down the content or to withhold the
account needs more policy or legal input, the case will be escalated to
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the respective teams. With regard to the large amounts of data
uploaded on the major platforms, the task of moderating surpasses any
dimension of what a human reviewer can handle. Platforms, therefore,
use technology as tools to recognize unwanted content and will
eventually be a replacement for human reviewers, although so far
there are no capable systems of that scale.
186

B. If Social Media Platforms Were Considered State Actors
An increasing number of scholars discuss whether subsuming
social media platforms under the public function exception and
turning them into state actors could solve the dilemma. According to
them, social media platforms could be categorized as the public square
of cyberspace, such as in Marsh v. Alabama, and the First Amendment
rights of their users should be protected. This argument comes not
only from the platforms offering an infrastructure for communication,
but also from the fact that platforms gain their value from the
participation of their users. Social media platforms turned
traditionally passive media consumers into active producers of
content. Without user-generated content, the business model of
intermediaries would no longer function because they, by definition,
do not produce their own content. Without their users, they would be
as empty as a vacant town square, solely animated by billboards. Is the
risk too big that without such regulation they “will trample on free
speech values in the relentless pursuit of profit”? Should social media
platforms subsequently be regulated to serve the public interest?
There are two main reasons why social media platforms cannot,
and perhaps should not, be subject to First Amendment obligations as
was the case for the company-town in Marsh v. Alabama. First, making
social media platforms state actors would result in prohibiting content
moderation as it is now since the platforms would be subject to the
strict scrutiny of the First Amendment, making content-based
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restrictions of protected speech invalid. That means they would be
deprived of the right to take down user-generated content on the basis
of their respective community guidelines and because of what this
content actually expresses. Second, they are themselves speakers
under the currently prevailing opinion, which makes a speech-related
regulation difficult. Other options are in discussion at the moment,
namely breaking up the biggest companies in an anti-trust interest.
This would have consequences on the underlying business model and
prevent companies from using their users’ data to fuel the attention
economy. This, in turn, would make it less attractive for the
platforms to algorithmically push hateful or shocking content on top of
newsfeeds, perhaps leading to a decrease of that type of content.
However, it remains to be seen whether the next administration takes
action in that direction.
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C. At Least Partly: Social Media Profiles as Designated Public
Forum
While the Court is reluctant to expand the company-town
analogy to other private actors, there has been a noticeable change at
the level of district courts with regard to digital forums, at least in
part. For instance, the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of
New York recently subsumed President Donald J. Trump’s Twitter
feed as a designated public forum, and the decision was confirmed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in July 2019. In this
case, filed by the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University, the Court was asked “to consider whether a public official
may, consistent with the First Amendment, “block” a person from his
Twitter account in response to the political views that person has
expressed, and whether the analysis differs because that public official
is the President of the United States.” The answer to both questions
was no. The Court considered “whether forum doctrine can be
appropriately applied to several aspects of the @realDonaldTrump
195

196

197

Langvardt, supra note 9, at 1364; Klonick, supra note 9, at 1664.
Mitch Stoltz & Shahid Buttar, Antitrust Enforcement Needs to Evolve for the 21st
Century,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUNDATION
(Feb.
27,
2019)
https://www.eff.org/de/deeplinks/2019/02/antitrust-enforcement-needs-evolve-21stcentury [https://perma.cc/6MML-57YB].
Van Dijck and Poell, supra note 178, at 6.
Robson, supra note 188.
Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d
226 (2nd Cir. 2019).
Knight First Amendment Inst., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549.
192
193

194
195
196

197

2020]

MERGING THE SOCIAL AND THE PUBLIC 1029

account rather than the account as a whole” and came to the
conclusion, that, yes, the tweets sent by the President qualified as a
designated public forum because the requirements for a governmental
forum were met. To reach this conclusion, the Court relied on
externalities, such as the description of the account (the
@realDonaldTrump account is presented as being “registered to
Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.’”) and on the actual usage to communicate policies
and appointments via this account.
This decision can serve as an indicator but should not be
overestimated. Categorizing the U.S. President as a state actor and
subsequently subject to First Amendment limitations is not
overwhelmingly surprising and only notable because it was embedded
in a social media setting. However, it shows that it is not sufficient to
invoke private property as a “shield” from any protection of speech.
Following the reasoning of the Court in Knight Institute v. Trump,
parts of a privately-owned infrastructure, such as social media
platforms, can be opened as designated public forums and provide
appropriate protection of free speech. In similar cases, users were
blocked from accessing government officials’ social media profiles, or
their comments were deleted.
Governmental communication via private digital actors, such as
social media platforms, is an area of research in itself. It begs the
question of government officials using the whole “toolbox” offered by
social media platforms, including preventing citizens from interacting
via their Facebook pages or Twitter profiles. Because Facebook pages,
for example, do not offer the ability to turn off the commenting
option, government officials sometimes struggle to find the appropriate
reaction to people contacting them over this medium. Researchers
found that some public figures prefer to hide comments than to delete
them because of the users’ reactions. Here again, there is a constant
dilemma between the advantages of fostering communication between
lawmakers and the people, and the downsides of state actors
potentially circumventing First Amendment restraints when they use
non-state actors for communicative purposes.
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In light of the issues encountered by the public forum doctrine
and the current developments of online speech, this article proposes a
solution based on the learnings from the comparative approach.
Representative democracy needs spaces for deliberation where citizens
can express political opinions and exchange views. The perspective
proposed below also builds on the fact that social media platforms are
governed not only by legislative rules but also largely by social norms,
similar to life in analog public spaces. Instead of holding on to
doctrinal categories from the past, the principles guiding the
application of constitutional norms can be adapted to societal
changes.
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A. Necessity for a New Public Forum Category?
A goal of comparative law can be to change perspectives and
perhaps to question dogmas that seem at first hand irrevocable. When
looking at the public forum doctrine, the strict separation between
public and private is legitimate because it restricts governmental action
on free speech. The perception of governmental power is very
different in the U.S. than in Germany, which is why this article does
not argue for a simple transfer of the FCC’s holdings to U.S.
jurisprudence. However, the reasoning behind the holdings in Fraport,
Bierdosenflashmob, or Stadionverbot can be helpful. The German
constitutional jurisprudence is highly influenced by Habermas and his
model of a deliberative democracy, which elevates the social
dimension on a higher level than in the U.S. where the priority of an
individual’s liberty is in line with the First Amendment’s principle of
autonomy. There is nevertheless some common ground between both
approaches, as the Court’s decision Packingham v. North Carolina
shows.
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Court stressed that the
importance of analog public forums had not diminished (“[e]ven in
the modern era, these places are still essential venues for public
gatherings to celebrate some views, to protest others, or simply to learn
and inquire”), but that new places for people to listen and to speak
have emerged. The Court recognized the central role that social
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media plays in the daily lives of average citizens and how barring
access to these platforms constitutes a severe restriction:
By prohibiting sex offenders from using those
websites, North Carolina with one broad stroke bars
access to what for many are the principal sources for
knowing current events, checking ads for employment,
speaking and listening in the modern public square,
and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human
thought and knowledge. These websites can provide
perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a
private citizen to make his or her voice heard.
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By calling social media platforms the “modern public square”
(and explicitly naming Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter in its
holdings), the Court acknowledged the reality of how most people use
the Internet and communicate digitally.
This decision confirmed what has been discussed for many years
amongst scholars arguing in favor of solutions that could serve both
free speech and the platforms’ rights, including the freedom to
contract. Regulating social media platforms might not be possible
because of the platforms’ own rights as speakers, but governmental
action could include providing more opportunities for public
communication. Courts could resolve the tension between users’ and
platforms’ free speech rights by prioritizing users’ rights over those of
companies. This could be underlined by the argument that there is a
need to “preserve a free society.” Other scholars invoke a more
affirmative protection of speech, similar to the Californian model, “in
recognizing the right of the public to engage in expressive conduct,
wherever the public freely gathers.”
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B. A New Public Forum Category?
In this last part, this article presents an idea of a “social” public
forum based on the findings above. By combining the problem of the
public forum doctrine that this article has called a “dilemma” with the
comparative analysis and the challenges emerging out of online
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communication, it shows that the public forum doctrine is not
equipped for speech expressed in the digital sphere.

1. Connecting the Dots
The public forum doctrine was developed to delimit and
consequently to guarantee places where citizens could speak freely,
and it is out of the question that public forums are necessary to enjoy
the freedom of speech. They must meet requirements defined by the
doctrine and be consistent with the purpose of the place. Only
traditional or designated public forums are subject to strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment; hence, a governmental act is a
prerequisite. In other constitutional traditions, such as Germany, a
space for free speech can also be defined by social norms or by their
social function for democracy. If a place is open to the general public
for the purpose of communication, it might be considered part of “the
public.” This allows more flexibility with regard to the spaces where
people actually meet and speak, such as social media platforms.
In the U.S., the lack of adaptability is, strictly speaking, not only
due to the public forum doctrine but also to the state action doctrine.
As long as the terms outlining which action can be recognized as state
action remain the same, no further exception will be added. As a
result, social media platforms are not state actors (and only to an
extremely limited extent designated public forums), which allows them
to moderate speech. On the other hand, they are not bound by
fundamental rights, although their role in online communication is
decisive, and the necessity of having access to the Internet and to
intermediaries has been acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court.
214

2. A “Social” Public Forum
Combining these findings, this article proposes a new category of
public forums which would merge the right of platforms to moderate
speech with the First Amendment freedoms that are necessary to use
the intermediaries’ services in a reasonable manner. It would be
applied by courts when interpreting a platform’s terms and services—
that is when users bring an action against a take-down decision in a
case of content moderation. The role of the judiciary will be crucial to
address the challenges described in this article. Judicial review has
already proven to provide answers to some of the questions raised.
Moreover, judicial review allows a dialogue between courts and
scholars that can be particularly fruitful because it offers entry points
for tradeoffs and flexibility. The idea of an additional category within
the public forum doctrine is therefore based on the observation that
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while the hands of legislative power are tied, the judiciary is playing an
important role in the process of defining the responsibilities of social
media platforms.
Courts can strike a new path by proposing a category of the
public forum that could potentially overcome doctrinal obstacles.
Although a new category in the doctrine implies a judicial review in the
first place, the chances are high that the jurisprudence will develop a
spillover effect and find its way into the internal content moderation
policies of large social media companies. The doctrine can only be
truly effective if companies apply it to more than just the single case
that was litigated.
The definition of this type of “social” public forum could be
based on the concept of the Public in German constitutional
scholarship, as well as on that of the public sphere, and on the
holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court. It would need to fulfill the
following criteria: (1) be a digital space open to the general public; (2)
serve the purpose of digital communication; and (3) be essential to the
public discourse in the digital age. Publicly accessible or open to the
general public means there are no special requirements for the person
registering. Requiring registration is not in itself sufficient to dismiss
the criterium. If a platform fulfills these criteria it would not be such a
social public forum as a whole. To be more concrete, the publicly
accessible part of a social media platform, such as its newsfeed with
public posts, would still be subject to the platform’s terms and
conditions, including its community guidelines regarding unwanted
user-generated content. Additionally, the platform would need to
consider the speaker’s free speech rights if the content is protected
speech under the First Amendment and does not fall in the categories
of unprotected speech. The review process for this type of unwanted
but not illegal user-generated content would require a more balanced
approach. The First Amendment restraints would only be applicable
to the parts described above and only to a certain extent.
One of the main challenges in this context is the question of how
we draw the line between private and public when it comes to
communication on platforms. To address this, we can rely on
jurisprudence but not completely. For example, in Packingham v.
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North Carolina, the Court has somehow overlooked the necessity for
more specific guidance. All platforms named in this decision were
summarized as a “modern town square” without acknowledging the
different services and functions they offer. This gap could be filled by
the social public forum category by applying the criteria presented
here. Accordingly, the scope of application would include public posts,
public events, public groups, and public pages of businesses that are
visible to all users of the platform, in continuity with the marketplace
analogy.
The parts used in Packingham as a “public modern square” with
public announcements would be considered such a social public
forum. Because of the private legal nature of the platform, its users,
and their relationship, the platform would still be allowed to moderate
content but in a way that would be more transparent and respectful of
individual rights. This hybrid category between public and nonpublic
forums would only be applicable to platforms of a certain size at the
courts’ discretion. Just as the creation of “the Public” as described in
the German cases requires a space to be open to the general public, to
be designed for people to communicate, and to be used as a host for
public discourse, the social public forum would only be open when
meeting all the requirements. This would prevent overburdening small
platforms that are only used to communicate about specific topics or
are not open to everybody.
Another point that requires clarification is whether social
platforms could be required to provide equal access to their services
within the scope of application and whether it should be somehow
guaranteed. They could, for example, be subject to the Equal Access
Act of 1948 (EAA), which is a federal law applicable to schools
receiving federal aid and opening limited public forums for noncurriculum related activities. The EAA states that equal access must
be provided to other interest groups when allowing a club or an
association to use the school’s premises for their activities.
The EAA was ruled constitutional in Board of Education of the
Westside Community v. Mergens. In this case, the Court held that a
group of students could form a religious study group and hold their
meetings in the school because the school opened limited public
forums. Formally, social media platforms are not subject to the EAA
because they are neither education facilities receiving federal aid nor
are they somehow governmental, which means they do not open
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public forums as state actors do. One could consider transferring this
principle to social media platforms by requiring them to allow all
registrants to their services access to the forum created or to allow the
creation of user groups without any limitation if a similar group has
been created before. The function called “groups” can, for example,
be found on Facebook. Any user can create a group, name it, and
invite others to join. The founder can decide what level of privacy the
group should have: public, closed, or secret. Public groups, their
names, and their respective descriptions, as well as public posts, are
available to everyone visiting Facebook without being logged in. The
names of members and administrators of public groups are only
visible to Facebook users. If provisions similar to the EAA were
applicable to such Facebook groups, users would still be allowed to
create secret groups, the most private form of group. It would,
however, require Facebook to treat the public groups equally.
There are nevertheless limits to the idea of a social public forum
within platforms: the content moderation would still happen according
to the standards set by the platforms’ policies. Only in specific cases
could a court rule that the take-down decision or the exclusion of users
by the platform was not respectful enough of its role as a host of public
discourse. There are only a few exemptions to the broad scope of
protection of the free speech clause, and platforms should be able to
limit user-generated content beyond these few categories of
unprotected speech. It will be the judges’ task to elaborate what the
threshold for speech protection under the social public forum will
be. They will have to form case law for the digital age in which the
offline limits between public and private spaces disintegrate. Hate
speech and misinformation are probably categories of unwanted
content that can be sanctioned, especially when directed at individuals.
Other cases could be less obvious, such as content categories
forbidden by a platform’s community standards but protected by the
First Amendment and sometimes not harmful per se. Nudity is an
example of content that might not be suitable to all ages but is not
harmful per se. The same argument could be made for other types of
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content including political speech which enjoys special protection
under the First Amendment, especially in a public forum.
Then again, political speech is probably the most difficult
category to delimit from others—what is political and what is not? Even
if jurisprudence and scholarship on how to define political speech, as
opposed to commercial or ordinary speech, exists, digitization has
generated new forms of expressions and trends in political activism.
The latter include memes (“an amusing or interesting item (such as a
captioned picture or video) or genre of items that is spread widely
online especially through social media” ), pictures of naked body parts
to advocate for gender equality, and other forms of text or images
sometimes combined. The imitation of cultural codes to convey a
political message has become an important part of Internet culture,
just as a caricature in print media is more than a drawing. Not only
are these new communicative conduits open for external creative
input, they are also more participatory than traditional media outlets
and in a sense more democratic. Keeping in mind the ideal of a
deliberative democracy, it is of high priority to take digital forms of
expression seriously. This includes being aware of the potentially
political messages they contain as well as their impact on the digital
sphere. Drawing the line(s) between different types of speech, such as
political, entertainment, satire, and commercial, is a task that courts
have been performing, which is another reason to plead for a way
forward that includes a judicial review.
This idea of a social public forum should not be misunderstood
as a form of “public use” of private property. Although this article
uses terms such as property and space to elaborate on the idea of a
new public forum on social media that moves closer to the public
sphere, this domain-related vocabulary is not intended to advocate
eminent domain on social media platforms. Nonetheless, this article
would push back on the arguments brought against the use of private
shopping malls and transferred on social media platforms. Shopping
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malls are considered as open to the general public, even if they have
opening hours, especially in the U.S. where shops are usually open
every day. A space open to all customers cannot be considered closed
to public use simply based on opening hours. In the same way, an
invitation to visit a neighbor does not make her house or garden a
public space, allowing someone to use it according to their own
wishes. Users are capable of differentiating between private and
public spheres within a platform, such as a private messenger-service
and a public post appearing in a platform’s newsfeed. The size
argument, on the other hand, is more valid: A small social media
platform might, but does not have to be, such a social public forum if
the number of users is relatively small. This was addressed in the
scope of application of the social public forum.
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3. Potential Pitfalls
a. The Problem of Scale
Of course, there could be a problem of scale: it is unlikely that all
cases of disagreement about content moderation can be decided by
national courts, at least in a satisfying timespan. There are two answers
to that allegation. One is the spillover effect which has already been
described and can be witnessed in some cases that arise in relation to
public outcry about platforms’ role in, for example, election
campaigns. Platforms are increasingly allowing internal remedy
mechanisms which can be interpreted as a reaction to the pressure of
governmental regulation and user mistrust. Some are even actively
asking governments to regulate platforms, such as Facebook and
Microsoft, perhaps to be held less responsible by users when in fact
there are already rules they could refer to.
So far, companies are not directly bound by human rights as
states are, but there are standards for companies, such as the United
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(UNGPs). According to the UNGPs, private actors must avoid
infringing on individual rights and be aware of their potential influence
on human rights. This principle could, for example, intend to
implement as far as possible the UNGP’s framework “Protect, Respect
and Remedy” to areas such as freedom of speech and information.
The second response to the aforementioned allegation is that
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platforms also use the argument of scale to reject access to remedies.
One should refrain from dismissing a proposed solution on the
grounds of lacking feasibility—even more, if it is used by both sides.
Again, the proposed solution should not necessarily be applicable to
small-sized platforms (although it could), but certain minimum
standards would not be overburdening for services with a large
number of users.
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b. Consequences for Publishers
When making sense of the digital sphere and the applicable legal
concepts, we often fall back on ideas and rules we know from the
analog world. It is often asked why social media platforms are not
treated as traditional mass media. Legally speaking, intermediaries are
exempt from editorial responsibility under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act. Furthermore, they cannot be held
liable for restricting content “whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected.” The proposed solution could, therefore,
fit into the current framework of intermediary liability, such as a
different regime than publishers.
However, the question should also be asked the other way
around: if platforms are obliged to put back user content due to their
categorization as a hybrid form of a public forum, would that also be
applicable to traditional media? Facebook, for instance, has been
under scrutiny for playing an ambiguous role when it comes to
curating content and for eventually becoming more similar to a
publisher than it claims to be. One could wonder if traditional media
have lost some of their editorial power through digitization and apply
this reasoning to them. Hence, they would also offer a similar type of
social public forum and could be forced to publish.
Although the idea is worth mentioning, social media platforms
and traditional mass media are so fundamentally different that they
should not be treated equally. Social media platforms rely on usergenerated content and provide a medium for every user regardless of
their personality, which is fundamentally different from newspapers
and broadcasting stations. When it comes to the comment section of
traditional media on social media platforms, it would be conceivable to
consider an additional forum within the social public forum. In
practice, user-generated content in the publicly accessible part of the
platform would be moderated by the platform’s moderation team
whereas the comment section below an article posted by a newspaper
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may be subject to their own moderation rules and overseen by their
community manager. This raises a whole other set of questions as to
the areas of responsibility for different actors within this new social
public forum category.

c. How to Adapt to Changes
The proposed solution relies on the premise that most social
media platforms offer the possibility for every user to make a
somehow public appearance and to share their content with the whole
network. The concrete forms vary between platforms, but there is a
similar idea of the “modern town square” in the form of posts as well
as events and groups that can, in theory, be seen by all users. How
flexible would the social public forum be to changes if platforms
change formally and/or substantively? What if social media platforms
turn to a different model? To be more specific, given the difficulty to
moderate speech due to the formal requirements of a public forum,
what if platforms remove the newsfeed? Facebook has recently
announced it would move to a more private type of service. In its
pledge to “privacy,” the world’s largest social media platform would
focus more on one-on-one communication and move away from the
model of users contributing to the newsfeed.
If Facebook introduces a more private model of social media
platform, does the new category of a social public forum become
obsolete? Not really. The discussion about the online public sphere
and how to subsume it under preexisting legal concepts does not
minimize its importance. Changing the service delivered by platforms
is not an answer to these questions, only a divergence. Whether it is in
“newsfeeds,” “groups,” “channels,” or other forms of social networks,
platforms connect people and enable communication. Giving up that
type of service would mean restricting the communication between
users to a one-on-one communication. Subsequently, social media
platforms would eventually resemble telecommunication providers
and be subject to, if not the same, at least very similar rules.
A substantive change by social media platforms would bear more
consequences. If they change their purpose by, for example, moving to
a model describable as a theme-based communication platform, the
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consequences would be more significant than after a formal change in
the form to communication. If private actors, like a club or an
association, choose a topic, they cannot be forced to deal with other
topics because of a possible violation of their own First Amendment
rights. The obligation to deal with a certain topic is a typical contentbased regulation that is not allowed under the free speech clause. A
reading club with an emphasis on Simone de Beauvoir cannot be
forced to discuss Marvel comics or Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings.
With regard to social networks, a substantive change could, for
instance, mean that platforms no longer strive to form global
communities and eventually connect the whole world. Instead, they
would limit their scope to topics and build communities around these
topics. Accordingly, they would no longer reflect the modern town
square because they would not be as general as before and would be
less bound by their users’ First Amendment rights. In theory, a change
to a platform model with a substantive focus would correlate with a
reduced, if not restrained, application of the social public forum. Even
though the platform would still fulfill the criteria of the category’s
scope of application, it would be under the condition that users want
to communicate about that specific topic. The platform could,
therefore, limit the users’ communication adequately. In practice, the
substantive focus would need to be narrow enough to effectively limit
user-generated content. It would need to be a network no longer
fulfilling the following generic definition: “[s]ocial media allows users
to gain access to information and communicate with one another
about it on any subject that might come to mind.” A platform like
LinkedIn that solely promotes itself as a professional network would
still fall under the public social forum because the topic of work is very
broad.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The public forum doctrine is not entirely apt to respond to
contemporary issues such as the one of content moderation on
platforms that are perceived as a public space by users but do not fall
under the definition of a First Amendment’s public forum. The shift
from analog space to cyberspace entails a shortening in the protection
intended to be provided by the public forum doctrine.
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This shift is a significant obstacle for speakers, particularly when
their speech is within the First Amendment’s scope of protection and
not necessarily violating community standards. When the
interpretation of such user-generated content is left to the moderators’
discretion, under the principle of taking it down when in doubt, there
is high risk of over blocking. Exploring foreign concepts of “the
Public” (such as in German constitutional jurisprudence) helps to
think beyond classical categories and to evaluate the necessity of a new
way to go for the public forum doctrine. In the present case, the
conclusions from the functional comparison even seem to support the
principles of First Amendment theory when referring to the social
function of free speech. It might also be reminiscent of Roosevelt’s
second bill of rights project, where he advocated a more social
perception of fundamental rights. The latter should serve not only as
a protection of liberty against the state but also as a duty to preserve
social cohesion. Given the offline consequences of harmful online
speech, such as extremism and terror, we need more clarity about the
role of public discourse in our society.
What are the basic points to bear in mind when thinking of a
deliberative space online? This article shows that one cannot simply
import traditional concepts into a new socio-technical infrastructure
without adapting the doctrine to a certain extent. In order to enable a
space for more speech without violating the rights of private actors,
such as platforms, the way forward is to ask ourselves how to build a
system that preserves democratic principles. It is necessary to preserve
the checks and balances of the current legal framework, maintaining a
clear separation of powers. This mainly translates into an ongoing
discussion of the notion of power beyond the separation of private and
public.
If we limit this debate to intermediary liability, there is a serious
risk of overlooking the intertwinement of state actors and non-state
actors in the context of online speech. Legal innovation through
judicial review can combine the social reality of concrete cases, the
voices of academia, and the flexibility of a case-by-case approach. Ad
hoc doctrinal application might not be desirable in terms of legal
uncertainty; however, it does provide a more open framework than
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regulatory interventions by the state. All in all, adding a hybrid
category to the public forum doctrine—a social public forum—could
help to overcome the current obstacles. It would not require a
regulatory act and could be integrated into the existing public forum
doctrine, leaving up to the courts’ discretion when to apply it.

